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Abstract
We propose a cognitive-dissonance model of norm compliance to identify con-
ditions for selfishly biased information acquisition. The model distinguishes be-
tween: (i) objective norm compliers, for whom the right action is a function of
the state of the world; (ii) subjective norm compliers, for whom it is a function
of their belief. The former seek as much information as possible; the latter ac-
quire only information that lowers, in expected terms, normative demands. The
source of ‘moral wiggle room’ is not belief manipulation, but the coarseness of
normative prescriptions under conditions of uncertainty. In a novel experimental
setup, we find evidence for such strategic information uptake. Our results sug-
gest that attempts to change behavior by subjecting individuals to norms can
lead to biased information acquisition instead of compliance.
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1. Introduction
Suppose an individual feels compelled to comply with a norm but is able
to influence what she knows about the normatively relevant facts. Can
she use her information acquisition choices strategically? For example,
imagine a company owner having to decide the size of a voluntary employee
performance bonus. The employee is about to leave the company for good5
and a ‘selfish’ employer would therefore give nothing. However, suppose
the owner feels bound by this social norm: ‘if an employee performed well,
he ought to be rewarded’. The norm compels the employer to pay a bonus,
but the size of the bonus depends on her beliefs about the employee’s
performance. In such a situation, the owner may want to find out that the10
employee performed poorly in order to save money without violating the
social norm.
In this paper, we demonstrate that individuals can ‘wiggle’ their way out
of normative pressure by strategically acquiring only information that can
activate less costly prescriptions. According to our model, these strategic15
incentives arise if norms prescribe the same action for different degrees
of beliefs under conditions of uncertainty. Our analysis thereby reveals
the important but so far largely neglected role of uncertainty in models
of norm-compliance. We also offer experimental evidence that individuals
strategically select normatively relevant information.20
We first provide the intuition for the theoretical mechanism we have in
mind before turning to a formal analysis. To continue the introductory
example, assume the employee has worked in a customer service function,
and the employer, unable to observe the employee’s performance directly,
has to ask clients to learn whether the employee performed well. To find25
out, she can contact two different clients for references: one known to be
a friend and one known to be a foe of the employee. Both are honest
but have a poor response rate when being asked for reference. First, if
the employee’s performance was good, the friend sometimes replies with a
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positive report and sometimes fails to respond. The foe never responds to30
avoid saying anything positive. Second, if the employee’s performance was
bad, the friend never responds to avoid saying anything negative. The foe
sometimes replies with a negative report and sometimes fails to respond.
In other words, the employer has the option to choose one or two types
of probabilistic signals about the employee’s performance. Each signal can35
only lead to certainty for one of the two possible states of the world as
displayed in this table:
employee’s performance
good bad
reference from
friend
‘good’ or no
response
no response
foe no response
‘bad’ or no
response
In a formal model, we derive two jointly sufficient conditions under which
asking only the foe is an attractive way to save norm-compliance costs.40
First, the employer must interpret the norm in a ‘subjective’ sense, so that
complying with the norm means performing the action that is consistent
with her beliefs about performance (rather than with what is factually the
case). Only if the demandingness of the norm (the cost of complying with
the norm prescription) depends on beliefs is it worthwhile to manipulate45
the beliefs by strategic information selection.1 By contrast, if the employer
interprets the norm in an ‘objective’ sense, the prescription does not de-
pend on beliefs and the strategic incentives vanish. Second, for strategic
information selection to arise, it also has to be the case that the action
prescribed by the norm only changes once the employer becomes (near)50
certain about the employee’s performance.2 The demandingness of the
1We will use the terms ‘demandingness of the norm,’ ‘demand of the norm’ and ‘norma-
tive demand’ interchangeably. We also use the terms ‘demanding’ und ‘undemand-
ing’ to compare norm compliance costs. With respect to the selfish employer, the
demandingness increases if the norm prescribes a higher bonus payment. More gen-
erally, the demandingness of the norm rises if the action it prescribes is further apart
from the action that would maximize utility if there was no normative prescription.
2We thank an anonymous referee for helping us to clarify this.
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norm is thus quite insensitive to changes in beliefs (as long as they do
not approach certainty). We later introduce the notion of ‘coarse-grained’
norms to capture this property formally. If the two conditions are met,
choosing to ask only the foe is attractive: if the foe responds, it lowers55
the normative demand, allowing the employer to give less; if the foe does
not respond, the normative demand remains unchanged. We also test the
implications of our model experimentally with a normatively framed dicta-
tor game with optional information choice, similar to the bonus payment
example introduced here.60
The phenomenon we are interested in is often framed in terms of ‘strate-
gic ignorance’. The seminal paper by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007,
‘DWK’ from now on) shows that uncertainty over the receiver’s payoff in-
creases ‘selfish’ dictator choices. Strikingly, in DWK’s experiments the
uncertainty can be resolved costlessly, but most dictators with selfish be-65
havior decide to remain ignorant, suggesting that these dictators ‘have an
illusory preference for fairness’ and ‘dislike appearing unfair’ (DWK, p. 67).
Grossmann and van der Weele (2013) offer a formal model for such strategic
ignorance. It suggests that DWK’s dictator information avoidance is driven
by self-image concerns in a Bayesian preference-signaling model, building70
on earlier work by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006, see also 2011). An agent
cares about his own payoff, to varying degrees about the payoff of others,
and about his self-image as an altruistic person, signaled by the actions
performed. The agent can choose whether or not to commit to a costly
prosocial action with a potential welfare benefit. Grossman and van der75
Weele show the existence of an equilibrium in which agents with limited
altruism decide to remain ignorant and refrain from acting prosocially. Cru-
cially, among the ignorant agents some would act prosocially if they knew
with certainty about the positive social benefits. The results are driven
by the fact that the signal about the agent’s type is stronger if the agent80
fails to engage in an action with certain rather than only potential wel-
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fare benefits.3 Grossman and van der Weele’s model (like all self-signaling
models, starting with Bodner and Prelec (2003)), crucially hinges on the
assumption of a dual self, such that one self is relatively more informed
about the agent’s type than the other self.4 Feiler (2014) offers an explana-85
tion of DWK’s results based on the model of moral preferences and moral
constraints by Rabin (1995): Agents following a moral rule have incen-
tives to ‘manipulate’ their beliefs to circumvent the constraints imposed
by this rule. Matthey and Regner (2011) provide yet another explanation
for strategic ignorance. They argue that ignorance is attractive because it90
lowers the cost of deceiving oneself about what one ought to do.
In this paper, we take a different route. First, the agents in our model
have perfect knowledge about their preferences, and uncertainty does not
serve as a self-deception tool. Second, we maintain that the focus on igno-
rance in previous papers has been too narrow. Our evidence suggests that95
ignorance itself is not a particularly special or desirable state (pace DWK,
Bicchieri, 2006, p. 128-9, and others). Rather, individuals will only stay
ignorant if resolving uncertainty will, in expected terms, increase normative
obligations and will actively seek information if, in expected terms, norma-
tive obligations will decrease. We locate the source of moral wiggle room in100
the nature of the norms followed. This, we will show, offers a parsimonious
yet powerful account of the mechanisms underlying moral wiggling.
Our findings add to the literature on self-serving biases. It has long
been recognized that norms often leave a fairly large room for interpre-
tation (Hechter and Opp, 2001) and create opportunities for self-serving105
biases. These biases in norm compliance are based on different mecha-
3Two experimental tests provide support for their model: Moral ignorance is strategi-
cally more valuable before a choice is made and some agents are willing to pay for
remaining ignorant.
4When taking decisions, the agent weighs in and anticipates which inference the un-
informed self will draw about the agent’s type. Conceptually, we can think of the
uninformed self as a future self with imperfect recall about the underlying motivation
behind past choices. The present self, being aware of the future self’s forgetfulness,
tries to manipulate the latter’s inference. While the authors stress the importance
of self-image concerns, it should be noted that the model stays formally the same
when the observer is another person, turning it into a social-image model.
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nisms: they can make use of uncertainty about either the behavioral rule
to be applied (‘what exactly am I supposed to do?’) or—more relevant
for us—about the state we are in (‘what exactly is the case?’). Konow
(2000) develops a model of self-serving biases due to the former and exper-110
imentally tests for these biases by studying the strategic manipulation of
beliefs about the applicable norm. Related experiments are conducted by
Bicchieri and Chavez (2013), Bicchieri and Mercier (2013), and Rodriguez-
Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012). By contrast, DWK find evidence for the
relevance of factual uncertainty. Similar results were obtained by Larson115
and Capra (2009); Grossman (2010); Matthey and Regner (2011); Con-
rads and Irlenbusch (2013); Grossman and van der Weele (2013) and Feiler
(2014).
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2,
we motivate the different notions of norm compliance. The formal model120
follows in section 3 and is extended beyond the core setup in section 4
(which a reader in a rush can safely skip). In section 5, we relate the model
to the existing literature on strategic ignorance. We then test the model’s
core predictions with a laboratory experiment in section 6. In the final
section, we summarize this paper’s theoretical and empirical contributions125
and put them into perspective.
2. Objective and subjective norm compliance
A social norm tells us what we ought to do if we find ourselves in a certain
situation; more technically, a social norm provides a mapping from a state
to a behavioral rule, i.e., a prescribed or proscribed act (see Bicchieri, 2006,130
ch. 1). In short, social norms take the form: ‘if X obtains, I ought to do
φ’. The condition ‘if X obtains’, for which the norm prescribes a certain
behavior (‘I ought to do φ’), can be interpreted in different ways. On
the one hand, the clause can be substituted by ‘if X is the case’. This
objective interpretation leads to prescriptions that are conditional only on135
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the state of the world and are thus entirely independent from the agent’s
beliefs. Consequently, an objective norm complier strives to perform the
action the state of the world demands. On the other hand, the clause can
be substituted by ‘if I believe that X’. This subjective interpretation leads
to prescriptions that are entirely contingent on the beliefs of the agent. If140
the norm is understood in the subjective sense, it is only prescriptive if the
agent has the specified belief. Thus, a subjective norm-complier strives to
perform the action his beliefs demand.5
Depending on one’s subjective or objective understanding of norms, one
can be subject to different forms of psychological costs when violating145
a norm. Following Konow (2000), these psychological costs from non-
compliance can be called cognitive dissonance.6 The dissonance arises be-
cause the agent experiences an unpleasant tension between what she ought
to do and what she actually does. In Konow’s model, the experienced dis-
sonance is traded off against utility from violating the norm, leading to150
more selfish behavior than prescribed by the norm.
Under certainty, objective and subjective compliance are behaviorally
equivalent because the epistemic state matches the state of the world. How-
ever, the two types of compliance come apart under uncertainty. An objec-
tive norm complier will suffer from dissonance under uncertainty because155
she cannot (at the same time) comply with what the norm prescribes for
two different states. In other words: an objective norm complier feels com-
5This distinction is echoed in ethical theory and epistemology. For example, Zim-
merman (2008) distinguishes between the objective and subjective view of moral
obligations. According to the objective view, one’s moral obligations are determined
only by the relevant facts, not by what one knows about these facts. The objec-
tive view therefore entails that ignorance or incomplete information does not change
one’s moral obligations at all (though most proponents of this view would say that
wrongdoing due to exculpatory ignorance may be blameless). According to the sub-
jective view, by contrast, moral obligations are a function of one’s knowledge. This
entails that incomplete or false knowledge of the facts changes one’s moral obliga-
tions. Zimmerman finds neither view convincing and instead defends the prospective
view, which (very roughly) expresses moral obligations as determined by expected
values, given one’s available evidence.
6The concept of cognitive dissonance builds on Festinger (1957) and was introduced
into formal economic theory by Akerlof and Dickens (1982) in order to explore the
welfare consequences of biased beliefs.
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pelled to ‘get it right’ and suffers dissonance because she (potentially) fails
to do so. By contrast, for a subjective norm complier, uncertainty is just
another possible epistemic state to which a norm applies. Doing what the160
epistemic state requires suffices to meet one’s obligations. Given this differ-
ence, objective and subjective compliers have different incentives to resolve
uncertainty. In our treatment of uncertainty, we assume that agents have
no intrinsic preference for information and also abstract from ‘meta-norms’
that prescribe information acquisition. This is not to say that neither is165
relevant in actual decision making. Instead, abstracting from these con-
founding motivations to acquire information gives us a clear distinction
between two very different forms of norm compliance.7
The example of the employee’s leaving bonus gave us a first taste how
subjective norm compliance and coarse-grained norms can create strate-170
gic incentives for acquiring information selectively. Similar incentives to
strategically acquire information can also apply in many other settings. For
instance, many people may endorse a norm against harming others. At the
same time, they cause excessive greenhouse gas emissions while preserving
a belief that the impacts of anthropogenic climate change are unclear. They175
might ignore articles in a Greenpeace magazine (or the IPCC reports for
that matter), but may well pay active attention to ‘climate change deniers’.
By consuming information from the latter, they may expect to either find
convincing evidence that there is not much to worry about one’s personal
lifestyle or to learn nothing substantially new at all. In the same vein, a180
consumer may avoid documentaries about the suffering of caged hens while
lapping up news about ‘organic food’ scams in order to avoid the normative
pressure to buy expensive eggs.
The behavior in such examples can be rationalized within our model by
assuming coarseness in the mapping from beliefs to prescriptions and the185
availability of signals for which a subjective norm complier has prior beliefs
7See Grossman and van der Weele (2013) for a model in which information acquisition
becomes morally relevant.
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about whether he might attain an attractive or an unattractive epistemic
state after acquiring the signals. The next section will formalize these
concepts and claims.
3. Formal model190
In order to introduce a formal distinction between objective and subjective
compliance, we model a dictator game, enriched by social norms of equity,
such that the receivers are more or less deserving. The dictator is initially
uncertain about the deservingness of the receiver, but can acquire signals
to eliminate this uncertainty. We will embed this setting into a simplified195
version of Konow’s (2000) model, and then extend this baseline model to
fit it to our setup.
The dictator has the amount y to distribute, such that he gives y to
himself and x = y¯ − y to the receiver (0 ≤ y ≤ y¯). The payoff utility
derived from this decision is v(y), with the usual assumption of positive but200
decreasing marginal utility of money, such that v′(y) > 0 and v′′(y) < 0. If
dictators were maximizing utility from monetary payoff only, their obvious
choice would be to set y = y¯. But besides monetary payoff, dictators also
care about limiting the difference between what they think is normatively
required and what they actually give. The greater the difference, the higher205
are the non-compliance costs in the form of cognitive dissonance.
For simplicity, we assume a dichotomous state space Ω = {L,H}, where
L and H can conveniently be interpreted as ‘low’ and ‘high’, indicating the
deservingness of the receiver.8 We call the actual state ω. For an objective
norm complier, the amount the dictator takes to be normatively permitted210
to keep (the ‘personal fair point’) is a function of the actual state ω; this
action is characterized by keeping φω. For a subjective norm complier, by
contrast, the fair point is a function of an epistemic state, characterized by
the (Bayesian) probability p that state L obtains (and 1 − p that state H
8A generalization to other state space partitions should be straightforward.
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obtains). This distinction between objective and subjective definitions of215
what is normatively required, expressed by φω and φp respectively, is the
crucial extension of Konow’s 2000 model. To simplify the analysis, we do
not model the internal process through which agents form their personal fair
points but treat them as exogenous.9 In the setting we consider, we assume
the φs to be a function of shared empirical and normative expectations of220
a relevant reference group.10
The dissonance cost experienced by the dictator is a function of the
difference ∆ = |y − φ| between the the fair point and what she actually
keeps, and the dissonance cost function f(y, φ) = f(∆) determines the
experienced disutility. As in Konow (2000), f is a twice differentiable,225
strictly convex function, such that f(0) = 0 (that is, if y = φ), f ′(∆) > 0
for ∆ 6= 0, and f ′′(∆) > 0.
The dictator’s decision problem is to trade off the utility from keeping
more money against the disutility from cognitive dissonance created by
deviating from the perceived fair distribution:230
max
y
E [u(y, φ)] ≡ E[v(y)− f(y, φ)] subject to 0 ≤ y ≤ y, 0 ≤ φ ≤ y.
The behavior of a dictator is therefore determined by the fair point φ and
by the relative value of money and cognitive-dissonance avoidance.
We first model maximization under certainty, in which factual and epis-
temic states match. Let φL and φH denote the fair points given the re-
spective state, assuming that y¯ > φL > φH > 0 (that is, it is fair to keep235
more in state L than in state H, but it is never fair to keep everything).
Let uˆ(φ) = maxy(v(y) − f(y, φ)) be the maximum utility achievable as a
function of φ. This function is increasing in φ as a higher fair point al-
9Konow (2000) also considers self-serving biases in the belief formation about what is
fair. As our research question focuses on strategic acquisition of information on the
receiver’s entitlement once the dictator has formed his belief on what he ought to do
under certainty, we do not model how individuals reach their normative beliefs. We
therefore take them as given, even though we concur that this is another important
form of self-serving bias.
10For details see Bicchieri (2006, ch. 1).
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lows the dictator to keep more for himself.11 Since we have assumed that
φL > φH , it follows that uˆ(φL) > uˆ(φH). When deciding on an alloca-240
tion in state H, the dictator reaches the maximum utility uˆ(φH), with
y∗H = argmax
yH
(u(yH , φH)). Similarly, when deciding on an allocation in
state L, the maximum utility is uˆ(φL), with y
∗
L = argmax
yL
(u(yL, φL)).
12
The novel aspect of our model is the treatment of uncertainty. For an
objective norm complier, cognitive dissonance depends on the state and245
can only be f(y, φH) or f(y, φL). Thus, under uncertainty, an objec-
tive complier cannot make sure to choose the morally appropriate action
that the (unknown) state requires. Therefore, the maximum expected util-
ity under uncertainty for a given p is achieved when keeping the amount
y∗U(p) = argmax
yU
(v(yU)− (1− p)f(yU , φH)− pf(yU , φL)).250
For a subjective norm complier, the normatively required action is a
function of his epistemic state. A norm implies a function that maps a
state onto a required action, in our case the amount one is permitted to
keep. We believe that social norms typically only provide a coarse-grained
mapping from states to prescriptions (but will consider a different mapping255
in the next section). The reason is tied to the necessity of enforceability.
For a social norm to exist, individuals must be able to reliably distinguish
between compliant and non-compliant agents in order to form behavioral
expectations and sanction transgressions. Since degrees of beliefs are not
observable in detail, it is unlikely that social norms take them as argument260
with any great precision. A norm that distinguishes between, for instance,
degrees of beliefs 0.6 and 0.7 simply cannot be enforced. This is mirrored
in our everyday language regarding normative choices, in which we rarely
refer to degrees of beliefs (let alone a Bayesian updating of normative pre-
scriptions).265
The function we consider here distinguishes between three epistemic
states: knowing that the receiver is deserving, knowing that the receiver is
11A formal proof is provided in the appendix.
12To ensure an interior solution, we assume that v′(y¯) < ∂f(y¯,φL)∂y , which implies that
y∗L < y¯ and y
∗
L > y
∗
H .
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undeserving, or being uncertain about the receiver’s deservingness. In such
a case, the fair amount φ is determined by a step function:
φp =

φL if p ≥ 1− 
φU if  < p < 1− 
φH if p ≤ .
(COARSE)
As the most general case, we assume that φL > φU > φH but will later270
consider other orderings. The parameter  ( ≥ 0) represents the margin
of tolerance for ‘near certainty’, i.e. the threshold beyond which there is
no longer ‘reasonable doubt’ about the state. For now, think of  as being
close to zero; we will later provide more precise boundary conditions. The
maximum utility under uncertainty is uˆ(φp), with y
∗
p = argmax
y
(u(y, φp)).275
In order to learn about the state of the world, dictators can optionally
acquire costless signals. There are two different signals available, repre-
sented by random variables SL and SH , and for each the dictator can
choose whether she wants to receive them. When obtaining signal SL,
the dictator has a chance to learn that the state is L. More precisely,280
the conditional probability s ∈ (0, 1) of learning that the state is L, given
that the state is indeed L, is s= Pr(SL = L|ω = L). Similarly, when
obtaining signal SH , we assume the same value s for the conditional prob-
ability of learning that the state is H, given that the state is indeed H:
s = Pr(SH = H|ω = H). In all other cases the dictator receives a ‘null’285
signal, which means the dictator remains uncertain about the state. After
a null signal, dictators perform a Bayesian update on the probability p that
state L obtains. If the dictator receives only signal SL = 0, then she up-
dates such that p′ = (1−s)p/ ((1− s)p+ (1− p)). Similarly, if the dictator
receives SH = 0, then she updates such that p
′ = p/(p + (1 − s)(1 − p)).290
We assume for both possible updates p′ that receiving a null signal never
removes uncertainty. This provides the following boundary conditions on
:  < p′ < 1− . Finally, if a dictator acquires both signals, but both are
12
null signals, no update is necessary, as the two signals cancel each other
out.295
We can now state how objective and subjective norm compliers will ac-
quire the signals on offer.
Proposition 1. Under uncertainty, objective compliers will acquire both
signal SL and signal SH .
Both types of signals increase the dictator’s chance to reach his utility300
maxima given the respective states. Having all available signals is best be-
cause additional free information can never reduce and will usually increase
expected utility as information increases the dictator’s chance to play the
optimal response to the state of the world. A proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Under uncertainty, subjective compliers who follow a coarse-305
grained norm (COARSE) will acquire signal SL but not signal SH .
For a sketch proof, recall that the maximum utility is increasing in the
fair amount to keep: uˆ(φL) > uˆ(φU) > uˆ(φH). COARSE, together with
the assumption that a null signal never removes uncertainty, ensures that
any update from p to p′ after receiving a null signal does not change φp. It310
is immediately obvious that obtaining signal SL is beneficial because there
is no down-side risk but a potential gain: it only increases the probability
of receiving the highest utility uˆ(φL). And it is equally obvious that ob-
taining signal SH is never beneficial because there is a down-side risk but
no potential gain: it only increases the probability of receiving the lowest315
utility uˆ(φH). A proof is provided in the appendix.
In our model all dictators hold unbiased (Bayesian) beliefs and all types
of dictators would prefer to be in a world in which they are paired with a
low performer and would use this fact to give little. However, an objective
norm complier, who only cares about the state of the world, cannot change320
the state and is therefore always better off with more information. A sub-
jective norm complier with coarse-grained norms, by contrast, who takes
prescriptions as a function of his beliefs, has ‘moral wiggle room’ (DWK).
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4. Model Extensions
4.1. Social norms with linear fairness points325
While there are good reasons to take the mapping from beliefs to prescrip-
tion to be coarse-grained, the model also allows for different mappings. On
the other end of the spectrum from coarse to continuous, it could be as-
sumed that the social norm is perfectly sensitive to p, stating a different
prescription for each epistemic state. For instance, the fair amount could330
be a weighted average of the prescriptions under certainty, such that
φp = pφL + (1− p)φH . (LINEAR)
Such a norm makes demands directly proportional to the Bayesian belief.13
With LINEAR, the predictions for information acquisition are dramati-
cally different:
Proposition 3. Under uncertainty, subjective compliers who follow a lin-335
ear norm (LINEAR) will not acquire any signals.
Intuitively, signals provide fair lotteries over different levels of φp. How-
ever, because of the decreasing marginal value of money the dictators are
risk averse and the maximum utility uˆ(φ) is concave.14 Therefore all such
lotteries have a lower expected utility than the utility of the status quo. A340
proof is provided in the appendix.
Note that the difference between propositions 2 and 3 lies in the way
dictators do or do not update what is normatively required when uncer-
tainty remains after acquiring a signal. When receiving a null signal after
acquiring SL, the fair point of a dictator following LINEAR will decrease345
such that he will feel forced to keep less for herself. In expected terms, this
decrease of the fair point entirely offsets the possible increase of the fair
13More precisely, LINEAR minimizes the expected distance between φp and φω, the φ
for the true (but unknown) state of the world.
14A formal proof is provided in the appendix.
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point if the dictators learns that the state is L. Based on the assumption
that marginal utility from keeping money is decreasing, a dictator follow-
ing LINEAR will therefore gladly decline the lotteries offered by either SL350
or SH . By contrast, a dictator following COARSE does not distinguish
the normative demand arising from different levels of probability under un-
certainty, and acquiring SL either leads to the desired state of certainty
(and therefore lowers his normative demands), or to no change at all—an
attractive proposition.355
4.2. Binary fairness points
The model can be adjusted to account for coarse-grained norms of subjec-
tive compliance that only know two different prescriptions by effectively
removing a separate fairness point under uncertainty. The crucial question
is whether uncertainty comes with a normatively demanding or an unde-360
manding action. In the first case, φU = φH < φL: As long as there is
reasonable doubt about the state being L, the normatively demanding ac-
tion shall be performed (such as keeping an underperforming employee on
the payroll). Once the threshold of reasonable doubt is passed, a norma-
tively less demanding action is permitted (laying off the worker). Within365
our model of dictator giving, a subjective complier would keep y∗U(p) = y
∗
H
as long as p ≤ 1 −  and y∗L > y∗H for p > 1 − , with p the belief that the
state is L.
In the second case, φU = φL > φH . In this case, agents are only expected
to perform the normatively demanding action if there is (near) certainty370
about the state being H. As long as there is reasonable doubt, agents can
feel entitled to perform the action that benefits themselves. In terms of
dictator giving, a subjective complier would keep y∗U(p) = y
∗
L as long as
p >  and would keep y∗H < y
∗
L otherwise (p ≤ ).
It follows straightforwardly from proposition 2 that subjective compliers375
have different incentives for signal acquisition in these two cases. When
φU = φH , an agent who is uncertain about the state of the world will prefer
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to acquire signal SL (to possibly reach state L) and will be indifferent
between acquiring SH or not (as φH will be demanded for all outcomes of
signal SH). When φU = φL, an agent will avoid acquiring signal SH as380
it can only make her worse off. This type of agent would be indifferent
between acquiring signal SL or not as there is nothing to gain (but also
nothing to lose).
4.3. Heterogeneity in subjective fairness points
Convinced, carefree and troubled egoists385
We will now allow for heterogeneity in personal fairness points and in the
relation between marginal utility of money and marginal disutility of norm
violation. This enables us to represent egalitarian and selfish behavior and
suggests some novel implications.
The first important case is φH = φL = y¯. An agent with such selfish390
fair points is convinced that the receiver is undeserving and will hence
keep everything for himself in all possible epistemic or factual states. In
the context of a dictator game, this agent behaves like a selfish ‘homo
economicus’. However, such an agent does care about norms—he suffers
cognitive dissonance from norm violation, i.e. if he does not get everything395
himself.15 By contrast, a standard ‘homo economicus’ who only cares about
his own income can be modeled as suffering no dissonance over the entire
action space: f(∆) = 0. We might call this type of agent a ‘carefree
egoist’. A carefree egoist does not care about any deviation from the fair
points and, for that matter, may not even have any relevant normative400
beliefs. For both convinced and carefree egoists, and regardless of whether
norm compliance is understood in the objective or the subjective way, it is
15Going beyond a dictator game, such a ‘convinced egoist’ would therefore be willing to
invest resources to ‘correct’ such an ‘unjust’ distribution. Hence, convinced egoists
are willing to engage in ‘spiteful’ behavior to reduce someone else’s income. This
implication, of course, generalized beyond this particular set of fairness points. All
norm compliers in our model are in principle willing to reduce someone else’s income
if this income is higher than their fair share.
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meaningless whether the state of the world is H or L. Therefore, egoists
are indifferent between acquiring or not acquiring any type of signals.
A third type of selfish agent is the ‘troubled egoist’. This agent does be-405
lieve that she ought not keep everything herself but her marginal disutility
from norm violation is smaller than the marginal utility of money over the
entire action space. Such an agent would therefore optimally set y∗ = y¯
but nevertheless suffers cognitive dissonance from norm violation. If the
agent’s fairness points are ordered such that φL > φH > 0, the troubled410
egoist would, in contrast to the convinced and careless egoist, strictly pre-
fer to be in state L than in state H because of the lower disutility from
norm violation. Consequently, in contrast to both previous types of egoist,
propositions 1 and 2 apply.
Egalitarians: pure and impure415
At the other end of the spectrum we can also model two different types
of egalitarians, ‘pure egalitarians’, who religiously follow their egalitarian
conviction and ‘impure egalitarians’, who fall short of their egalitarian nor-
mative beliefs. For this section we allow the dissonance function to be
kinked at zero (and therefore non-differentiable at that point). Both types420
of egalitarians have fairness points φH = φL = y¯/2. They come apart in
the relative size of the marginal utility of money compared to the marginal
disutility from norm violation at the equal split (y = y¯/2). At this point
(and therefore over the relevant action space of y ∈ (y¯/2, y¯)), pure egalitari-
ans have a higher marginal disutility from norm violation than the marginal425
utility of money: v′(y¯/2) < ∂f(y¯/2)
∂y
. Such an agent will therefore split the pie
equally between himself and the receiver: y∗ = y¯/2. ‘Impure egalitarians’,
by contrast, have an interior solution to their maximization problem (with
v′(y¯) < ∂f(y¯)
∂y
and v′(y¯/2) > ∂f(y¯/2)
∂y
) such that y∗H = y
∗
L = y
∗
U(p) > φH = φL.
These types of egalitarians are indifferent towards acquiring signals, re-430
gardless of whether they are subjective or objective norm compliers, just
like the convinced and carefree egoists.
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5. An Alternative Explanation of Strategic
Ignorance
DWK (2007) provide experimental evidence that agents often prefer to435
remain ignorant about the negative consequences of their selfish acts. We
will show that our model offers a parsimonious explanation of their results.
The DWK subjects play a binary version of the dictator game. Dictators
can choose between actions A and B to determine the payoffs for them and
their receiver. In the baseline treatment, A results in distribution (6,1), B440
in (5,5). Here, 74% of dictators choose the fair and efficient option B. By
contrast, in the hidden information treatment, the outcomes are assigned
in two different ways with equal probability: either A causes (6,1) and B
(5,5), or A causes (6,5) and B (5,1). By default, it is unclear whether A or B
hurts the receiver, but, importantly, the dictator can optionally resolve this445
uncertainty costlessly by clicking on a button. Almost half of the dictators,
however, deliberately remain ignorant and 86% of those choose the payoff-
dominant action A, even though there is a chance of 1
2
to impose a severe
negative externality on the receiver.
We call the state in which A causes a negative externality H and the450
state in which it does not L, with p as the Bayesian belief that L is the
case. For subjective compliers, DWK’s setup can be modeled with a social
norm that has only two fairness points:
prescription =
φL (do A) if p > φH (do B) if p ≤ 
If p is greater than , uncertainty comes with the normatively undemand-
ing prescription φL, as in the second case of section 4.2. Such a binary455
social norm can explain the seeming discrepancy in the behavior of the
dictators in the baseline and hidden information treatment. Many dicta-
tors behave consistently with such a binary social norm and choose action
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B under certainty about the state being H (p = 0). Under uncertainty,
by contrast, subjective compliers decide to remain ignorant and enjoy the460
monetary benefits of choosing A. Revealing the game’s payoff structure is
akin to acquiring a perfectly informative signal that will reveal the state
of nature being either H (p = 0) or L (p = 1). Therefore, by clicking on
the button that is being offered, the dictator can only lose: either he will
have to choose B or he stays put where he would be under uncertainty465
anyway—being permitted to choose A.16
DWK do not provide a formal model for the behavior they observe, but
they suggest that dictators have an ‘illusory preference for fairness’ and
that many of them only want to appear fair, either to themselves or to
others. More generally, DWK view ignorance as a particularly desirable470
state for dictators, as their selfish behavior can be hidden (from others
or themselves). We offer a different explanation: In our model, ignorance
is not used to hide at all—in the DWK setup it simply turns out to be
an attractive epistemic state for subjective norm compliers because it is
undemanding. Our explanation of strategic information acquisition also475
does not rely on the assumption of a dual self or on uncertainty as a self-
deception tool; rather, signal choices can be modeled as a deliberate and
rational process with perfect knowledge about one’s preferences.
In addition, our model offers an interesting interpretation for the sizable
fraction of dictators in DWK who choose to reveal: they can be modeled as480
objective norm compliers, for whom the prescription demands implement-
ing the fair outcome regardless of whether they know which action pro-
duces this outcome. A ‘fair’ objective complier, who would choose fairly in
the baseline treatment with complete information, strictly prefers to know
which action produces the fair outcome in the hidden information treat-485
ment and will act accordingly. The model also allows for a ‘selfish’ objective
complier who would choose the payoff-dominant option in the baseline con-
16Note that we do not have to assume  to be particularly small in order to explain the
ignorance of dictators, as p is 12 under uncertainty in DWK’s experiments.
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dition with complete information. For this type of dictator, the dissonance
from norm violation is smaller then the gain in monetary utility. Such a
‘selfish’ objective complier is indifferent between revealing the game’s pay-490
off structure or not and would not react to the signal outcome (see the
appendix for a proof).17
6. Experimental test
6.1. Hypotheses
Our new experimental setup is designed to test whether individuals strate-495
gically seek (as well as avoid) normatively relevant information. All studies
known to us have only ever offered, in the terminology of our model, a sig-
nal similar to SH but never a signal akin to SL. This has led to the belief
that ‘wiggle room’ is intimately linked to the option of remaining uncertain
or ‘strategically ignorant’. In marked contrast, our model suggests that500
getting some information, but not all information, is often the best way to
‘wiggle’.
The theoretical underpinning is provided by proposition 2, which is a gen-
eralization of claims pertaining to strategic ignorance. To test proposition
2, our experimental design explicitly implements a coarse-grained norm,505
distinguishing it from all previous experimental work in this area. The
design also uses the central elements of the model in section 3: a dictator
game embedded in social norms of equity such that the receivers are likely
to be perceived as either deserving or undeserving by the dictators; and,
crucially, an opportunity for dictators to acquire signals SH and SL, which,510
in expectations, reduce the dictator’s uncertainty about the deservingness
of the receiver.
17Our model can therefore also capture the fraction of dictators who choose to reveal
and then choose the selfish option (25% of those revealing in DWK’s data). The
difference to proposition 1, which stipulates a strict preference for information, stems
from DWK’s design, in which dictators can only choose two options. In the more
general case of inner solutions to dictator’s allocation problems, objective compliers
strictly prefer more information (as captured by proposition 1).
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The null hypothesis H0 states that dictators will acquire SL and SH
equally often. H0 can be derived in the form of full information acquisition
from theories that assume genuine preferences for fair outcomes; it is also515
captured by proposition 1, based on the assumption of objective norm com-
pliance. Note that H0 is also consistent with ‘strategic ignorance’ and with
proposition 3 of our model for the case of a linear norm under uncertainty.
The novel part of our experimental test is the alternative hypothesis H1,
derived from proposition 2, based on the assumption of subjective compli-520
ance to a coarse-grained norm. It states that dictators will seek information
strategically by acquiring SL but not SH .
6.2. Experimental stages
We now explain the stages of the experimental study (a more expansive
account is provided in appendix F). The subjects in the main study (which525
we simply call ‘experiment’) play a normatively embedded dictator game
in which the dictators decide on the distribution of 20 Euros. First, and
prior to the experiment, we elicit normative beliefs within the same subject
pool. Specifically, the subjects of this norm elicitation session receive a de-
scription of the setup of the experiment and are asked how much a dictator530
ought to give to a high performer and a low performer (see appendix G for
details). According to the modal responses in the norm elicitation session,
dictators ought to give 10 Euros to a high performer (state H in the model)
and 5 Euros to a low performer (state L in the model). We thereby anchor
the personal fair points of all dictators at φH = 5 and φL = 10. This greatly535
reduces normative uncertainty and allows us to study the consequences of
factual uncertainty, the focus of this paper.
Second, in the experiment we create two types by playing a competitive
knowledge quiz. All subjects answer knowledge questions taken from ‘Who
Wants to be a Millionaire’ under time pressure. The best 75% performers540
are declared ‘high performers’, the lowest 25% ‘low performers’. All sub-
jects are informed that doing well in the quiz (i.e., being a high performer)
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makes it more likely to (i) be a dictator in a subsequent dictator game; and
(ii) to win a ‘bonus’ of 20 Euro that is available for distribution between the
dictator and a receiver later on. We then assign dictator and receiver roles545
such that all dictators are high performers, while receivers are, in equal
shares, high and low performers.
Third, before the dictator-receiver pairs are formed, the dictator game
is played with a strategy method. More precisely, all dictators submit a
strategy of how much to give:550
(i) in case they learn they are paired with a low performer; and
(ii) in case they learn they are paired with a high performer.
When entering the strategy, the dictators do not know whether or under
which circumstances information about the type of their receiver might
become available to them, but they are told that their strategy choice555
is binding. Before choosing the strategy, we inform the dictators that if
they remain uncertain about the type of their receiver, the mean of the
two stated amounts will be transferred to the receiver. After entering the
strategy information, the dictators are paired with equal probability with
either a high performer or a low performer, but they do not learn by default560
which type of receiver they are paired with.
Fourth, the dictators have an unannounced opportunity to acquire infor-
mation that may inform them about the type of their receiver. To make
this optional information uptake intuitively plausible, we tell the dictators
that the information about the (lack of) deservingness of their receiver is565
contained in exactly one of four envelopes symbolically displayed on screen.
If the receiver is a high performer, the information is in one of two envelopes
called ‘gold envelopes’. If the receiver is a low performer, the information
is in one of two envelopes called ‘silver envelopes’. The subjects can open
up to one envelope of each type. More formally, the signals available are570
SL and SH , as described above. That implies four different sets of signals
can be chosen: {}, {SL}, {SH}, or {SL, SH}. A dictator wishing to obtain
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as much information as possible will open one envelope each, a dictator
who only wants to increase the chance of learning that the receiver is a low
performer will only open a silver envelope, and so on.18575
Finally, the dictator game is implemented. Whether a dictator-receiver
pair gets a bonus of 20 Euro for distribution depends on the type of the
receiver: the bonus is always provided if the receiver is a high performer but
only with probability 1
2
if the receiver is a low performer. This fact, which
the subjects were informed about at the start of the session, underscores580
the distinction between deserving and undeserving receivers: only being
paired with a high performer increases the chance to win a bonus. At the
end of the treatment, the bonus (if available) is distributed according to the
strategy of the dictator and the information the dictator obtained about
the receiver. All parameters and stages in the experiment apart from the585
information acquisition are common knowledge among the subjects.
6.3. Experimental strategy
Our experimental strategy differs from previous investigations of ‘strategic
ignorance’ because we test different hypotheses. The possibility to reject
H0 hinges on two conditions: First, we must be able to observe the signal590
choices of dictators with personal fairness points φiL > φ
i
H (with i now in-
dicating the individual dictator). Second, a coarse-grained norm of desert
under uncertainty (instead of, for instance, a linear mapping of prescrip-
tions to beliefs) must be induced successfully. In this section we explain
our use of the strategy method and our method for creating or reinforcing595
a coarse-grained norm.
We establish a social norm of appropriate giving as a function of desert
through the instruments described in the previous section. We thereby
emphasize that deserving and undeserving receivers ought to be treated
18In terms of model parameters, the prior probability for the types is therefore p = 12
and the probability of resolving uncertainty when choosing the ‘correct’ signal is
s = 12 .
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differently. But despite these efforts, there is still likely to be heterogeneity600
among dictators. In our setup, a social norm of equity conflicts with a
social norm of equality, which suggest fairness points of φiH = φ
i
L = 10.
In addition, some experimental subjects may also be ‘convinced’ or ‘care-
free egoists’ (see section 4.3), who believe they deserve to keep everything
themselves, with φiH = φ
i
L = y¯.
19 Therefore, we measure dictator compli-605
ance with the exogenously introduced social norm of equity by employing a
variant of the strategy method (Selten, 1967) and then offer an opportunity
to acquire signals. The strategy method is a standard experimental tool for
an economical data-collection process, to lead subjects to make thoughtful
decisions and, important for our purposes, to gain better insights into the610
motives underlying decisions (Brandts and Charness, 2011).20 In partic-
ular, the strategy method allows us to separate those with and without
incentives to strategically acquire information. Two measures are taken to
ensure truthful revelation of allocation intentions: First, dictator allocation
strategies are binding and cannot be changed after acquiring information.615
Second, when the dictators enter their strategies, they do not yet know
about the signals that become available later. This ensures that dictators
treat both epistemic states H and L as equally relevant when deciding over
the allocation of money.
We implement the coarse-grained norm by restricting the action space of620
dictators under uncertainty. We inform the dictators that if they remain un-
certain about the type of their receiver, the mean of the two stated amounts
19While our design gives very little reason for this belief from an ‘intellectually honest’
perspective, previous research has shown that fairness perceptions are often selfishly
biased (e.g., Babcock et al., 1995; Konow, 2000).
20In the model, when dictators decide over the signal acquisition, they first calculate
expected utilities of signal acquisition by solving for the optimal allocation in the
different epistemic states. By first eliciting the dictator giving strategy, we gain
insights into part of this decision process, which would otherwise be a completely
black box. While the strategy method should yield the same observations than the
direct-response method according to standard game-theory, it has been criticized
on the behavioral grounds that a ‘cold’ strategy might be systematically different
than a ‘hot’ direct response. The Brandts and Charness (2011) meta-study largely
alleviates such concerns (apart from studying punishment behavior, which is more
pronounced under the direct-response method).
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for states H and L will be transferred to the receiver: yU = (yL + yH)/2.
With the amount for uncertainty fixed externally, the dictators cannot
change their giving continuously as a function of their belief about the625
receiver type. This makes following a linear norm impossible. More impor-
tantly, it also provides a strong normative justification for giving the same
amount under uncertainty even if beliefs change, inducing the crucial flat
part of the function φp, which drives proposition 2. In addition, by setting
yU in between yL and yH this method mirrors a symmetric norm under un-630
certainty, which seems a natural starting point to test for subjective norm
compliance, as it ensures that the monetary incentives of acquiring either
signal is the same in absolute terms for all dictators. Note therefore that
our experiment is not designed to test for the prevalence of coarse-grained
norms (this is left for future research), nor do we focus on how much dicta-635
tors give under uncertainty about the receiver’s deservingness. Instead, we
want to test whether making a coarse-grained norm salient can be a source
for both strategically ignoring and seeking information.
6.4. Procedures
Our subjects were recruited with the online recruitment system ORSEE by640
Greiner (2004) from the student subject-pool of the Cologne Laboratory for
Economic Research at the University of Cologne (CLER). Subjects had not
previously participated in dictator-game or normative-choice experiments.
However, all subjects had some previous experience with laboratory ex-
periments. We first ran one survey session with 26 participants to elicit645
normative beliefs. Subsequently, we ran three experimental sessions with
32 participants each, resulting in 48 independent observations of dictator
behavior. Subjects took part in only one session and assumed only one role.
General instructions about the experiment were provided on paper (see ap-
pendix H). The summary part of the instructions was also read aloud to the650
subjects with two PowerPoint slides facilitating understanding. All subse-
quent interactions took place at computer terminals in cubicles, controlled
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with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Anonymity was guaranteed by ensuring
that subjects were randomly matched and by prohibiting communication
between the subjects during the experiment. Average payments in the main655
experiment were 14.3 Euros, close to the expected value of 14.5 Euros. In
addition to the expected earnings of 15 Euros per dictator-receiver pair,
each subject received 5 Euros show-up fee and 2 Euros for completing a
post-experimental questionnaire. Sessions lasted on average 90 minutes.
6.5. Results660
Before proceeding to the signal acquisition choices, the main variable of
interest, we first look at the dictators’ allocation strategies. The creation
of a wedge in entitlements, in line with the model’s assumptions, is suc-
cessful: dictators commit to giving, under certainty, significantly more to
a high performer than to a low performer (p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank665
test).21 As can be seen from Figure 1, no dictator would give more to a
low performer than to a high performer. Note that the number of horizon-
tally clustered dots in Figure 1 indicates the frequency of the coordinate,
each data-point corresponding to the transfer strategy of one dictator. On
average, dictators commit to giving a substantial amount to both types of670
receivers. The mean contribution to low performers is about 3.7 and to
high performers approximately 6.6.22 However, Figure 1 also shows that
there is a substantial number of dictators who do not differentiate between
high and low performers (visually represented by the observations on the
45 degree line). These dictators are apparently not receptive to the norm of675
desert we tried to make salient. Among these, two types (see discussion in
section 4.3), stand out: ‘egoists’, who keep everything for themselves, and
‘pure egalitarians’, who split the pie equally with any type of receiver. We
21All statistical tests are two-sided.
22Note that the significantly (p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) closer alignment
of dictator-giving with normative prescriptions in state L than in state H is also
predicted by our model. On average, dictators fall short of what is normatively
required by only 1.3 in state L but by 3.4 in state H.
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asked our subjects in a post-experimental questionnaire about the motives
of their giving decision. Not all subjects stated clear reasons, but the an-680
swers nevertheless shed some light on the difference between differentiating
and undifferentiating dictators. Specifically, most of the 11 dictators who
mentioned considerations of equality and selfishness did not differentiate.23
By contrast, the 21 subjects who mentioned either entitlement/desert or
norms as motives (while neither mentioning equality nor selfishness) dif-685
ferentiated more strongly in their giving decision (average difference 4.7
Euros). This shows that subjects motivated by egalitarian values or self-
ishness tended to reject the norm we instilled, while others were receptive
to it.
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Figure 1: Dictator transfer strategies.
When analyzing dictators’ signal choices, we distinguish between dicta-690
tors with differentiated and undifferentiated giving strategies. The former
give more when they learn that they are paired with a high performer than
a low performer, the latter give the same amount. Figure 2 depicts the
information acquisition choices of the dictators with differentiated strate-
gies in light gray and of the dictators with undifferentiated strategies in695
236 subjects mentioned considerations of equality, 4 selfishness, and 1 both equality
and selfishness. Among these 11 subjects, 9 had completely non-differentiated giving
strategies, the other 2 gave only 2 Euros more in case they learn they are paired with
a high performer.
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Figure 2: Distribution of information acquisition choices for subjects with
differentiated and undifferentiated strategies.
dark gray. The signal choice of one self-reportedly confused subject is ex-
cluded, which leaves us with 30 dictators with differentiated and 17 with
undifferentiated strategies.24
As the hypotheses are based on the assumption of a wedge in entitle-
ments, we first focus on the dictators with differentiated strategies. For700
this group of dictators, SL is the modal choice of signals (43.3%), in line
with H1. Acquiring both signals accounts for 30% of types of signal choices.
Based on descriptive statistics, subjective compliance therefore organizes
the data better than objective compliance or notions of ‘genuine fairness
preferences’. The null hypothesis of equally frequent choices of SL and SH705
is rejected at a significance level of p=0.029 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
The rejection of H0 is driven by the marked difference in selective in-
formation acquisition: There are three times as many dictators who only
chose SL than dictators who only chose SH . As acquiring both signals is the
second most frequent choice, this type of behavior cannot be dismissed eas-710
ily. At first sight, this seems to indicate the presence of objective compliers
among the dictators. However, Figure 2 also clearly shows that acquiring
24The subject stated in the post-experimental questionnaire of having mixed up her or
his choices.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES SL and SH SL SH no signal
y∗H 0.434*** 0.0953 0.112
(0.16) (0.21) (0.19)
y∗L -0.705** -0.278 -0.209
(0.29) (0.25) (0.23)
Constant -0.746 -0.510 -1.002
(0.84) (0.86) (0.98)
Observations 47 47 47 47
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: Multinomial logistic regression to explain signal choices.
both signals becomes the overwhelming choice for dictators with undifferen-
tiated strategies. While this group of dictators is not a randomly selected
control group, their behavior nevertheless suggests that getting as much715
information as possible is the default choice when no economic incentives
are at stake.25 The motivation behind this can be compliance with an epis-
temic norm to acquire as much information as possible or, plainly, curios-
ity.26 The marked and statistically significant (p=0.008, Mann-Whitney U
test) jump in the choice of SL when comparing dictators with and without720
economic stakes makes the evidence for subjective compliance in line with
the alternative hypothesis 1 even stronger: strategic information acquisi-
tion is virtually non-existent for the latter, but makes up the largest share
of information choices for the former.
The role of incentives for selective information acquisition is also evident725
25Let us remind the reader, however, that the group of non-differentiating dictators is
very heterogeneous and consists of pure ‘egoists’ as well as ‘egalitarians’.
26There is some evidence, however, that the choice of acquiring both signals follows
different processes when comparing those with and without economic incentives: de-
cision times are, on average, considerably and weakly significantly longer for the
former than the latter (25.9 vs 14.6 seconds, p=0.073, Mann-Whitney U test). This
suggests that acquiring both signals is the result of a deliberative process for the
group of dictators with differentiated strategies; curiosity alone might not be a good
explanation for this group’s choice of signals. Future research may try to further
distinguish objective compliance from other motivations to acquire maximum infor-
mation.
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from the multinomial regression in table 1, which takes the choice of both
signals as the reference category. A dictator is more likely to choose only
SL the more differentiated the giving strategy is: The probability to choose
only SL rises in the contribution to the high performer and decreases in
the contribution to the low performer. Recall that a dictator can, in mon-730
etary terms, potentially gain yL − yU = yL − yL+yH2 by acquiring SL and
could potentially lose yU − yH = yL+yH2 − yH by acquiring SH . Qualita-
tive responses in the post-experimental questionnaire are in line with the
choice analysis: 7 out of the 10 differentiating dictators who choose only
SL and provided reason for the signal choices mention a monetary mo-735
tivation (one dictator also directly states that choosing only SL allows a
larger payoff without having a bad conscience). Neither the regression nor
the post-experimental questionnaire shed any light on the reasons behind
the remaining two types of information acquisition, choosing only SH and
choosing no signal. The latter type of behavior (‘complete ignorance’)—740
while not predicted for our experimental setup—could be captured within
the model by assuming that these dictators follow a linear norm under un-
certainty and were consequently not receptive to the coarse-grained norm
we tried to implement. The choice of only SH by differentiating dictators
(anything can happen with undifferentiating strategies) is outside any the-745
oretic framework. The inconclusive statements in the post-experimental
questionnaire as well as their low frequency makes mistakes or behavioral
noise the most likely reason for these types of signal choices.
To take stock, we ask: How well does our and some relevant competing
theories explain the results? To begin with, models of purely outcome-based750
preferences account for the results badly, as they are inconsistent with both
core findings. First, most subjects differentiate between the different types
of receivers. Second, strategic information acquisition is inconsistent with
all fairness preference models, and that includes context-sensitive theories
of entitlement and desert. If subjects want their own allocation strategies to755
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be realized, they should choose both signals.27 The strategic signal choices,
by contrast, provide support for our model’s core prediction.
7. Summary and discussion
Depending on one’s objective or subjective interpretation of norms, one
can be subject to different forms of psychological costs when violating a760
norm. In line with Festinger (1957) and Konow (2000), we model these
costs as cognitive dissonance that arises when acts do not match what the
norm requires. Following the subjective interpretation, individuals expe-
rience cognitive dissonance if their beliefs and the norm together imply
prescriptions they violate. When an agent is a subjective complier, she can765
strategically choose the sort of information that might render selfish actions
morally appropriate. By contrast, an objective norm complier is better off
with more information about the state of the world as this improves his
chance to choose the morally appropriate action.
Our model is widely applicable and can, for instance, explain strategic770
ignorance in dictator games, as found by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007–
DWK) and others. DWK interpret their results as evidence for an ‘illusory
preference for fairness’. They view ignorance as a desirable state that comes
with lower normative demands or allows to hide selfishness (from others or
oneself). In our model, subjective compliers do not strive for ignorance775
as such; instead they decide with their signal choice whether and which
lotteries to play over their beliefs about the state of the world. The signals
offered by DWK (and others) just weren’t very attractive, as normative
demands could only increase. Contrary to previous explanations, we do
not need to assume self-deception or a dual self. Our model locates the780
source of the ‘moral wiggle room’ in the strategic use of coarse-grained
norms under conditions of uncertainty.
27See Feiler (2014) for an elaboration of why outcome-based expected utility models are
inconsistent with strategic information acquisition.
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A new experimental test provides evidence for strategic information ac-
quisition in line with subjective norm compliance. By giving our subjects
the chance to selectively avoid and acquire information, we find empirical785
support for our hypothesis that subjects engage in self-serving information
acquisition (not just avoidance) to reduce norm compliance costs. In light
of this, recent proposals to use social norms as a subtle yet effective policy
tool are perhaps not quite as promising as one might think. Rather than
making individuals comply with what the norm prescribes, they can make790
individuals look for information in a selfishly biased way to make the norm
subjectively less applicable to them.
Which debiasing tools are available? Our model suggests two interven-
tions that would work but come with significant drawbacks. First, one
could promote norm compliance in the ‘objective’ sense. This eliminates795
the ‘wiggle room’. However, a purely ‘objective view’ is difficult to defend
because it implausibly expects individuals to do what the state of the world
demands, even if they have no opportunity to know what this state is. A
second, equally unpromising intervention would promote subjective compli-
ance with a norm that is linearly responsive to beliefs. As we have shown,800
a linear social norm indeed eliminates the bias in information acquisition.
However, it is difficult to imagine how such a norm could be enforced since
degrees of beliefs are rarely observable in detail. A linear social norm also
comes at the considerable cost of eliminating all incentives for information
acquisition.805
Fortunately, there are interventions that hold more promise. One such
intervention consists of emphasising ‘meta-norms’ of information acquisi-
tion. According to one such meta-norm, individuals are expected to use
all information that is obtainable with reasonable effort before taking im-
portant decisions (such as, following our running example, asking both the810
foe and the friend for reference before deciding on the bonus payment).
One can understand these meta-norms as rules to determine how diligently
individuals have to gather evidence before subjective compliance becomes
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permissible. Last but not least, one could also aim to make norms more
demanding under uncertainty. In particular, if a selfish action carries so-815
cial risk, social norms could prescribe a pro-social action unless there is
sufficiently strong evidence that no such risk is present. If so, individu-
als have no incentive for selfishly biased information acquisition as further
information can only reduce compliance costs.
Finally, our model and the supportive experimental results suggest some820
directions for future research. We believe that the investigation of ‘moral
wiggle room’ should move away from focusing on ‘ignorance’ only. In addi-
tion, the recent emphasis on self-deception or dual selfs, fascinating as the
results certainly are, might have diverted attention from a simpler expla-
nation: the imperfect incentives created by social norms under conditions825
of uncertainty, which some smart individuals are bound to exploit.
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Appendix895
A. Proof that uˆ is increasing and concave
To show that uˆ′(φ) > 0, note that, by construction of the optimal giving
choice, y∗ ≥ φ. Applying the envelope theorem we obtain
uˆ′(φ) =
∂
∂φ
u(y, φ)
∣∣∣∣
y=y∗
=
∂
∂φ
(v(y∗)− f(y∗ − φ))
= − ∂
∂φ
∆∗
∂
∂∆∗
f(∆∗), with ∆∗ = y∗ − φ
=
∂
∂∆∗
f(∆∗) = f ′(.) > 0
Note that ∂
∂φ
∆∗ = −1 because ∂
∂φ
y∗ = 0.
To see that uˆ is concave, we calculate the second derivate:900
uˆ′′(φ) =
d∆∗
dφ
d
d∆∗
f ′(∆∗)
=
(
dy∗
dφ
− 1
)
f ′′(.) < 0
The first factor is negative because of the decreasing marginal utility of
money, which means that an increase in φ by one unit leads to an increase
in y∗ by less than one unit. This shows that uˆ is concave.
B. Proof of proposition 1
To show that objective compliers acquire both signals, we calculate the905
maximum expected utility the agent can achieve as a function of belief p.
Call this u∗(p, y∗U(p)) = maxy v(y) − pf(|y − φL|) − (1 − p)f(|y − φH |),
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where y∗U(p) is the maximizing argument for a given p. According to the
envelope theorem, the total derivative at point y∗U(p) is equal to the partial
derivative:910
du∗
dp
=
∂u
∂p
∣∣∣∣
y=yU∗
= f(|y∗U(p)− φH |)− f(|y∗U(p)− φL|).
The second derivative with respect to p is
d2u∗
dp2
= sign(y∗U(p)− φH)y
′∗
U (p)f
′(|y∗U(p)− φH |)
−sign(y∗U(p)− φL)y
′∗
U (p)f
′(|y∗U(p)− φL|).
Note that by the assumption of an interior solution to the dictator’s
maximization problem, it must be the case that y∗U(p) > φH , that is, the
dictator would keep, at all p, more than the fair amount of giving in state H.
Depending on the level of p and the relationship between marginal utility915
from money and marginal disutility from cognitive dissonance, y∗U(p) can
lie between the two fair points, at φL or will be larger than φL. Consider
first the case φH < y
∗
U(p) < φL:
d2u∗
dp2
= y
′∗
U (p)f
′(y∗U(p)− φH) + y
′∗
U (p)f
′(|y∗U(p)− φL|) > 0.
In the case that y∗U(p) = φL we find:
d2u∗
dp2
= y
′∗
U (p)f
′(y∗U(p)− φH) > 0.
Finally, if y∗U(p) > φL we find:920
d2u∗
dp2
= y
′∗
U (p)f
′(y∗U(p)− φH)− y
′∗
U (p)f
′(y∗U(p)− φL) > 0.
Since φH < φL it is true that y
∗
U(p) − φH > y∗U(p) − φL and since, by
assumption, f ′ > 0, it is the case that f ′(y∗U(p) − φH) > f ′(y∗U(p) − φL).
y
′∗
U (p) > 0 because the more likely state L is, the more the dictator will
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keep. Since d
2u∗
dp2
is therefore larger than 0 in all cases, we have established
that u∗(p) is convex. Finally, note that each signal offers a fair gamble over925
this convex function, which will always be accepted, so that both signals
will be taken by the objective complier.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
To show that subjective compliers following a coarse-grained norm acquire
only signal SL, we compute the expected utilities of acquiring signals SL,930
SH , both signals, or none. Note that, by assumption, receiving a null
signal always yields φp = φU . This simplifies the expected utilities of the
respective signal acquisitions:
EuL = psuˆ(φL) + (1− ps)uˆ(φU )
EuH = (1− p)suˆ(φH) + (1− s+ ps)uˆ(φU )
EuLH = psuˆ(φL) + (1− p)suˆ(φH) + (1− s)uˆ(φU )
Eu0 = uˆ(φU )
Since φL > φU > φH it follows that uˆ(φL) > uˆ(φU) > uˆ(φH). It is
now obvious that EuL > EuH , EuL > EuLH and EuL > Eu0. Therefore935
acquiring only SL is the best choice.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
To show that subjective compliers following a linear norm, note first that
when no signal is acquired, φp remains unchanged at pφL + (1 − p)φH
between φL and φH . Acquiring signal SL either leads to φL with proba-940
bility ps or to an increase in φp after the Bayesian update to p
′ = (1 −
s)p/ ((1− s)p+ (1− p)). Acquiring signal SH either leads to φH with
probability (1 − p)s or to a decrease in φp after the Bayesian update to
p′ = p/(p + (1 − s)(1 − p)). When acquiring both signals, φp can go to
38
φL, φH , or stay the same (in case of two null signals). As can be checked945
easily, the expected value Eφp for all these (fair) lotteries is just the ini-
tial φp = pφL + (1− p)φH . However, since uˆ is a strictly concave function,
Euˆ(φp) < uˆ(Eφp) because of Jensen’s Inequality.
28 Therefore, the expected
utility of acquiring a signal is always lower than the utility obtained when
not acquiring a signal, and thus not acquiring a signal is always preferred.950
E. Proof of objective compliers’ preference for
information in DWK
In DWK’s hidden information treatment, dictators are uncertain about
the game’s payoff structure but know that both possible states of the world
are equiprobable. The utility of an objective complier who does not know955
which state she is in is:
EuU = v(y
∗
U) − 0.5f(y∗U − φL) − 0.5f(y∗U − φH), with φL prescribing
the undemanding (payoff-dominating) action A and φH prescribing the de-
manding action B and the star denoting, as before, the optimal amount to
keep (in this case y∗U = argmax
y
(u(y, φL, φH)).960
As revealing the game will resolve uncertainty entirely, the expected util-
ity of doing so is:
EuR = 0.5 ∗ uˆH + 0.5 ∗ uˆL
= 0.5 ∗ (v(y∗H)− f(y∗H − φH)) + 0.5 ∗ (v(y∗L)− f(y∗L − φL))
= 0.5 ∗ (v(y∗H) + v(y∗L))− 0.5 ∗ (f(y∗H − φH) + f(y∗L − φL)),
with the hat denoting, as before, the maximum utility in the respective
state. An objective complier will prefer to reveal if doing so increases
expected utility:965
28Let X be a non-degenerate random variable and f(X) be a strictly concave function
of this random variable. Then Ef(X) < f(EX) (see e.g. Varian, 1992, 182).
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EuR − EuU = 0.5 ∗ (v(y∗H) + v(y∗L))− v(y∗U)− 0.5 ∗ (f(y∗H − φH)
+f(y∗L − φL)) + 0.5(f(y∗U − φL) + f(y∗U − φH)). (1)
Because of the experimental design, y can only take on two values, de-
pending on which option is chosen. The optimal choice under uncertainty
is obviously yA (as the expected norm violation is the same for both options
but A dominates B in terms of payoffs for the dictator).
There are therefore 2 meaningful cases:970
1. ‘Selfish’ dictator: y∗L = y
∗
H = yA
Expression (1) then simplifies to:
EuR − EuU = 0.5 ∗ (v(yA) + v(yA))− v(yA)− 0.5 ∗ (f(yA − φH)
+f(yA − φL)) + 0.5(f(yA − φH) + f(yA − φL))
= 0.
A ‘selfish’ dictator is therefore indifferent between revealing the game
structure or remaining uncertain.
2. ‘Fair’ dictator: y∗L = yA and y
∗
H = yB975
Expression (1) then simplifies to:
EuS − EuU = 0.5 ∗ (v(yA) + v(yB))− v(yA)− 0.5 ∗ (f(yB − φH)
+f(yA − φL)) + 0.5(f(yA − φH) + f(yA − φL))
= 0.5 ∗ (v(yB)− v(yA)) + 0.5 ∗ (f(yA − φH)− f(yB − φH))
= 0.5 ∗ [v(yB)− f(yB − φH)− (v(yA)− f(yA − φH))].
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By assumption, a ‘fair’ dictator prefers to choose B in state H. Con-
sequently, the expression in square brackets is positive.
This proves that an objective complier will weakly prefer to reveal the game
in DWK’s hidden information treatment. More precisely, a dictator who980
would choose selfishly (option A) in the baseline condition with complete
information is indifferent between revealing or remaining ignorant. By con-
trast, a ‘fair’ dictator who would choose the fair option B in the baseline
treatment strictly prefers to reveal and will choose according to the signal.
F. Details of experimental design985
F.1. Creation of social norms about receiver-entitlements
In order to test for subjective and objective norm compliance, we create
(or make salient) a set of social norms of entitlement whose violation would
create cognitive dissonance. We take several measures to achieve this:
First, the receivers’ entitlements were manipulated by linking the perfor-990
mance in the quiz to the chance of a dictator-receiver pair winning the bonus
of 20 Euros. Subjects are informed that a low-performing receiver does
not contribute to the pair’s chance of winning the bonus, whereas a high-
performing receiver contributes as much as the dictator to the pair’s win-
ning chances. In the experiment, this was represented by high-performers995
contributing a ‘winner lot’, but low-performers only contributing a ‘blank
lot’ to each pair’s bonus draw. The existence of the 20 Euro fund would
be determined by a draw of one lot from the pair playing, with a winner
lot providing funds, a blank lot no funds. A pair of two high-performing
players would always have 2 winner lots, therefore always draw a winner lot1000
and consequently always have 20 Euros to distribute. A pair of one high-
performing and one low-performing player would win funds with probability
0.5.
Second, to turn this wedge in entitlements into a set of social norms on
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dictator-giving, we aim at creating social norms, i.e., shared beliefs of what1005
others expect one ought to do (Bicchieri, 2006). To that effect, the subjects
in the main study are informed about the results of an earlier survey regard-
ing the normatively appropriate behavior in the experiment. We reported,
truthfully, that the mode of respondents in the earlier survey thought that
a dictator should give 10 (out of 20) Euros to a high performer, and that1010
the mode of respondents thought a dictator should give 5 (out of 20) Euro
to a low performer. More precisely, in this survey, 18 of 26 subjects judged
10 to be the appropriate payment to a high entitlement receiver, while 12 of
26 though that a payment of 5 was appropriate for a receiver with low enti-
tlement (and 5 was the mode for that question). As these numbers suggest,1015
the variance in the survey regarding the latter question was significantly
higher. This is unsurprising because a dictator playing against a receiver
with high entitlement is in a clear situation of symmetry with the receiver:
they are both in the same performance class, and have equally contributed
to the funds for distribution, strongly suggesting an equal distribution. By1020
contrast, it is less obvious how much a dictator (who always has a high
entitlement) should give a receiver with low entitlement. Reassuringly, 18
of 26 respondents in the preliminary study stated that a lower amount for
a low performer is appropriate, in line with our expectations.
Third, all subjects are made aware that each receiver will be informed1025
about the matched dictator’s transfer decisions in order to make receiver
expectations salient.
Fourth, to assess and further strengthen the relevance of the social norms,
we asked all subjects before performing the quiz how they valued, on a scale
from 1 to 4, the correctness and personal relevance of the announced nor-1030
mative expectations elicited in the prior norm induction session. Precisely,
subjects were asked to rate for both modes of normative expectations to
what extent they consider the 26 students’ opinion in the previous survey
a) to be ‘right’ and b) to be ‘important’ for them personally.
Based on the model’s assumption of φ as exogenous parameters set by1035
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social norms, the fair points are estimated as φH = 10 and φL = 5.
This fourfold treatment makes the mentioned fair points salient, com-
municates a normative expectation as to what one should do, and, since
all subjects are informed, makes it ceteris paribus more likely that other
dictators will also comply, creating or reinforcing a social norm of equity.1040
Compliance can plausibly be conceived in a subjective or an objective sense,
as the wording did not refer to the epistemic state of the dictator.
Subsequently, all subjects played a competitive quiz consisting of 15
questions in the style of the well-known TV-show ‘Who Wants to be a
Millionaire’ under time pressure. Correct answers were rewarded with pos-1045
itive points, incorrect or missing answers with point deductions. Points
increased with difficulty. The performers in the top three quartiles were
assigned the name ‘Gold Quiz-Players’ (high entitlement), the last quartile
‘Silver Quiz-Players’ (low entitlement). In each session, all 16 dictators
were drawn from the 24 Gold Quiz-Players, while the receivers were consti-1050
tuted by the remaining 8 Gold and 8 Silver Quiz-Players (see assignment
as Screen 1 in Appendix I).
F.2. Dictators’ transfer strategy
The dictators’ giving strategy was elicited in order to have an empirical
estimation of the individual responsiveness to the entitlement norm. At1055
that stage dictators know that they are a high performer themselves, but
they do not know which type of receiver they will face. Dictators bindingly
state two amounts: the amount they give to the receiver if they learn the
receiver is a high performer (xH), and the amount they give if they learn
the receiver is a low performer (xL). Dictators do not directly choose the1060
amount to be transferred if they do not learn which type the receiver is.
Instead, this amount (xU) is calculated as (xH + xL)/2, of which dictators
are explicitly made aware of (see Screen 2 in Appendix I). We refrained
from letting the dictators choose xU in order to create a coarse-grained
normative system and test proposition 2. Thus, we inform the subjects1065
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in the written instructions that giving (xH + xL)/2 under uncertainty is
appropriate because this is equi-distant from xH and xL. This has the added
benefit that, in absolute terms, the monetary consequences of acquiring
either signal are the same. When entering the strategy, the dictators do not
know under which circumstances the information about their receiver might1070
become available. The written instructions informed the subjects that more
information on this would become available onscreen. This seems to have
successfully inhibited questions from subjects on this delicate element as
no subject asked the experimenter about the conditions under which the
dictator would know which type of receiver she would be matched with.1075
F.3. Information acquisition and payoffs
The optional opportunity to acquire information about the receiver is the
crucial design element to test for objective and subjective norm compliance.
After each dictator has been matched with a receiver, they have the options
(i) to receive no signal, (ii) signal SL, (iii) signal SH or (iv) both signals.1080
The prior probability that the state is L is p = 1
2
and the probability of
removing uncertainty when choosing the ‘correct’ signal is s = 1
2
. The
four options are implemented by presenting dictators with four envelopes
on their computer screens (see Screens 3–5 in Appendix I). We call two of
these envelopes ‘gold envelopes’, the other two ‘silver envelopes’. Exactly1085
one of these four envelopes contains (represented electronically) the lot
of the receiver (which in turn reveals the performance of the receiver).
If the receiver has a winner-lot, it will always be in one of the two gold-
envelopes, while a blank lot will always be in one of the two silver-envelopes.
The dictator can now choose to open one gold-envelope; open one silver-1090
envelope; open one gold- and one silver-envelope; or open no envelope.
We subsequently (electronically) ‘open’ the chosen envelopes and show the
results. If the dictators find the receiver lot, they have certainty about
the receiver’s type. If they do not find the lot, uncertainty about the type
remains. Opening a ‘silver’ envelope means receiving SL and opening a1095
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‘gold’ envelope receiving SH .
As the dictator’s contribution strategy depends on what the dictator
learns about the type of the receiver, the information received determines
which amount will be transferred if the bonus is won in the final stage.
Dictators are informed about the monetary consequences of the information1100
acquisition. In fact, dictators have to run through a series of test question
in order to minimize errors on their part. Note that receiving only SL (only
SH) never leads to certainty about the receiver being a high performer (low
performer); xH (xL) will therefore never be transferred. If the bonus is
won, the dictator receives yH if he has found a ‘winner lot’ (and therefore1105
has learned that the receiver is a high performer), yL if he has found a
‘blank lot’ (and has therefore learned that the receiver is a low performer)
and yU if he has not found the receiver’s lot (and therefore has not learned
whether the receiver is a low or a high performer).29
G. Instructions in the norm elicitation session1110
The decisive part of the description of our experiment for the participants
in the norm-elicitation session reads as follows (translated from German):
‘All participants take part in a knowledge quiz. The ques-
tions come from the TV game show ‘Who Wants to Be a Mil-1115
lionaire’. As in the real game show, the questions become more
and more difficult. On the basis of their performance in the
quiz, participants are divided into two groups: a ‘gold group’
and a ‘silver group’. Silver Quiz-Players are the 25 % with the
lowest number of points in the quiz. The remaining 75% are1120
Gold Quiz-Players.
29We deliberately left open whether the receivers would be informed about the signal-
choice of the dictators (in fact, receivers are not informed), as we did not want the
dictators to wonder about information acquisition norms or create an experimenter
demand effect towards acquiring or not acquiring signals.
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All players receive a fixed amount of 5 Euros for participation
in the quiz.
At the end of the experiment, all participants take part in
pairs in a lottery. In the lottery each pair has a chance to win1125
a bonus of 20 Euros. A pair consists of two participants. One
participant (the ‘allocator’) in a pair decides how to allocate
the bonus in case that they win the bonus.
Composition of pairs1130
The allocator is always a Gold Quiz-Player. The recipient is
either a Gold Quiz-Player or a Silver Quiz-Player. One half of
the receivers are Gold Quiz-Players and another half are Silver
Quiz-Players. The chance of a pair to win the bonus depends
on the performance of both participants in the quiz.1135
For every Gold Quiz-Player one lot is drawn. There are al-
ways two lots in the pot and one of them is a winning lot.
This means that if the allocator is matched with another Gold
Quiz-Player, the pair wins the bonus with certainty. If only the
allocator is the a Gold Quiz Player, the pair wins the bonus1140
with 50% chance. A Gold Quiz-Player brings his/her 50% win-
ning chance, whereas a Silver Quiz-Player cannot contribute to
the chance of winning the bonus.
The allocator receives the compensation for participation of
5 Euros plus, if the pair wins the bonus, the amount the al-1145
locator assigned to himself/herself. The receiver receives the
compensation for participation of 5 Euros plus, if the pair wins
the bonus, the amount the allocator assigned to him/her.’
After these instructions are read, all participants answer on-screen test
questions to make sure that the setup is understood. We then ask what1150
the allocator should give to ‘Gold Quiz-Players’ and ‘Silver Quiz-Players’
(the precise wording is: ‘what do you think is the right amount to give to
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the. . . ’). In our experiment, we report the respective modal answers 5 and
10 to make that norm salient.
H. Written instructions for all participants in
the (main) experiment
47
Experiment Instructions (translated) 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision-making experiment. Please read this description of the 
experiment carefully. For the entire duration of the experiment any communication with other experiment 
participants is prohibited. Please turn off your cell phones now. It is a mandatory requirement for participation 
in this experiment to comply with these rules. 
If some points remain unclear, please read the experiment instructions again. For any remaining questions, 
please raise your hand. We will come to your desk and answer your questions in person. All important details 
of the experiment are also shown on  screen. In addition, test questions help to ensure that all participants 
understand the experiment correctly. 
You can earn money in this experiment. You will always receive a compensation of 5 Euros for participation 
in today’s experiment. For the completion of questionnaires at the end of the experiment you will receive an 
additional 2 Euros. How to earn any further money will be explained in these instructions. Your data and 
decisions are anonymous. Your answers and decisions cannot be linked to your identity and no person-
identifying data will be saved. 
Part 1: Quiz 
All participants take part in a knowledge quiz. 
After the completion of the quiz, participants are divided into two groups: 
• "Gold Quiz-Players": the 75% of all participants with the highest relative quiz performance 
• "Silver Quiz-Players": the 25% with the lowest relative quiz performance 
• You will not be informed of your individual performance in the quiz. 
• Gold Quiz-Players get a winner lot for their performance. Silver Quiz-Players get a blank lot.  These 
lots are used in a 20-Euros-draw, which is explained below. 
•  
Part 2: 20-Euros-draw  
• Two players each form a participant-pair and take part in the 20-Euros-draw. A pair always consists of 
an allocator and a recipient.  
• Which receiver and which allocator form a participant-pair is determined at random. 
• Both the allocator and the recipient bring their lot from the quiz to the draw. 
• All allocators are recruited from the Gold Quiz-Players and therefore always bring a winner lot to the 
draw. 
• Half of the recipients are recruited from the Gold Quiz-Players and half from the Silver Quiz-Players. 
So half of the recipients bring a winner lot and half bring a blank lot to the draw. 
• Neither the recipient nor the allocator knows if the recipient brings a winner lot or a blank lot to the 
draw. However, depending on the further course of the experiment, this information might be revealed 
to you. More information on this will be available on the screen. 
• One of the two lots provided by the participant-pair will be drawn. 
• If a winner lot is drawn: the allocator has to distribute the 20 Euros between himself and the recipient.  
• If a blank lot is drawn: the 20 Euros are not won. 
Task for the Allocator: 
• The allocator decides on the allocation of the 20 Euros before he gets matched with a recipient.  At this 
point it is still unknown which type of lot the recipient will bring into the lottery and if the 20 Euros 
will be won.  
• The allocator decides on the allocation in advance and bindingly. The distribution depends on the 
information the participant-pair will receive about the lot of the recipient:    
• The allocator determines in advance the amount that will be transferred to the recipient in 
case the pair learns that the recipient is a Gold Quiz-Player and brings a winner lot into the 
lottery. This amount is called GOLD-transfer. 
• The allocator determines in advance the amount that will be transferred to the recipient in 
case the pair learns that the recipient is a Silver Quiz-Player and brings a blank lot into the 
lottery. This amount is called SILVER-transfer. 
• These amounts determine: 
• GOLD/SILVER-transfer:  the amount that will be transferred to the recipient if the pair 
does not learn which lot the recipient brings to the draw.   
o GOLD/SILVER-transfer = average of the GOLD-transfer and the SILVER-
transfer. This amount is of equal distance to the GOLD-transfer and the SILVER-
transfer. This amount is chosen because it is either possible that the recipients brings 
a winner lot, or that he brings a blank lot. 
• In case of winning the 20 Euros: 
• The recipient gets, depending on the three cases, either the GOLD-transfer, or the SILVER-
transfer, or the GOLD/SILVER-transfer. 
• The allocator gets 20 Euros minus the corresponding transfer. So either 20 minus the GOLD-
transfer, or minus the SILVER-transfer, or minus the GOLD/SILVER-transfer. 
 
Information for the recipient at the end of the experiment:  
• The amounts of the GOLD-transfer, SILVER-transfer, and GOLD/SILVER-transfer, which were 
determined by the allocator; 
• If the 20 Euros have been won; 
• Which kind of information the allocator got regarding the recipient’s lot; 
• In case of winning the 20 Euros, whether the GOLD-transfer, the SILVER-transfer, or the 
GOLD/SILVER-transfer was transferred to him. 
 
Chronological sequence: 
1. Quiz 
2. Players with the highest relative performance become Gold Quiz-Player (with a winner lot) and 
players with the relatively lowest quiz performance become Silver Quiz-Player (with a blank lot). 
3. Division into allocators and recipients. Allocators are Gold Quiz-Player. Recipients are, distributed 
randomly, half Gold Quiz-Players and half Silver Quiz-Players. 
4. Allocators decide on GOLD-transfer and SILVER-transfer. From these amounts the GOLD-SILVER-
transfer results (The average of GOLD-transfer and SILVER-transfer). 
5. Each allocator is matched with a recipient. 
6. The participant-pair might or might not get the information about the type of the recipient’s lot. 
7. The draw decides whether the pair wins 20 Euros or not. Exactly one of the two lots of the players is 
picked at random.  
8. In case of winning: Distribution corresponding to allocator's  transfer decisions.   
9. Allocators and recipients get information about the results of the experiment and their own payoff.  
This sequence is represented graphically below: 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
I. Important treatment screens (translated)
Screen 1
Screen 2
Screen 3
Screen 4
Screen 5
